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Abstract
Canada’s copyright system imposes a levy on manufacturers
and importers of blank audio recording media. Revenue raised
by this levy goes to the eligible owners of musical copyright—
rightsholders. Thus, Canada squarely faces the reality of the
modern age by acknowledging that users will duplicate
copyrighted material at the same time that it attempts to
guarantee compensation to certain rightsholders. Like its
counterpart, the American Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,
this system has certain fundamental flaws. What these flaws
indicate about the future of copyright law is unclear.
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INTRODUCTION
<1> At the threshold of the new millennium, John Perry Barlow of
the Grateful Dead wrote of the public’s common disregard of
current copyright law: “We’ve won the revolution. It’s all over but
the litigation.”2  This forecast resonates today in the wake of a
recent decision by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal exempting
manufacturers and importers of mp3 players from a levy imposed
on recorders of blank media such as rewritable compact discs.3  The
revenue from this levy goes to eligible authors, performers, and
makers who own rights in musical works embodied in sound 1
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recordings—the rightsholders.4  Since Canada anticipates that users
will duplicate copyrighted recordings, it attempts to compensate
rightsholders for such use through the distribution of the levy
proceeds. Although this is a valiant effort to balance the needs of
rightsholders with the reality of modern use, the Federal Court
decision is one manifestation of the weaknesses of this levy system.
Much like its counterpart in the United States, the American Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992 (“AHRA”),5  the Canadian levy system
may prove ineffectual because of its misdirected technological focus.
Contrary to Barlow’s assertion, a copyright reform revolution has
hardly been won; it is still in the heat of battle, uncertain where it
will go.
LEVIES IN CANADIAN MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW
<2> Canada’s Copyright Act (“Act”) protects the original expression
of ideas, i.e., it protects certain categories of works and other
subject matter.6  It does so by giving the rightsholder a bundle of
exclusive rights relating to the use of the protected work, including
the right to reproduce it.7  Pursuant to Part VIII, the Act allows
duplication of copyrighted material for private use so long as
rightsholders retain the right to be compensated for such
reproduction.8  To ensure this compensation, the Copyright Board
of Canada (“Board”) is authorized to establish levies on
manufacturers and importers of blank audio recording media that
may potentially be used to store private reproduction.9  One
example is the audiocassette. This is a classic medium used to
make the proverbial “mixed tape,” a colloquial reference to a
collection of copies of what are usually copyrighted songs. The
revenues from the levies on these media are then distributed to
rightsholders.10
<3> The Board has implemented its statutory obligation through a
series of levies on audiocassettes, MiniDiscs, recordable compact
discs (“CD-Rs”), rewritable compact discs (“CD-RWs”), recordable
audio compact discs (“Audio CD-Rs”), and rewritable audio compact
discs (“Audio CD-RWs”).11  Manufacturers and importers naturally
pass on the cost of the levy to consumers, who thus pay more for
their products.12
<4> The Board has an obligation to create levies that are “fair and
equitable.”13  The Canadian Private Copying Collective (“CPCC”)—
the body that collects and distributes the levies14  —implemented a
system that had originally been approved by the Board called zero-
rating. This system exempts from the levy purchasers who register
that they do not partake in private replication of copyrighted
musical works embodied in sound recordings (e.g., companies that
duplicate media for businesses).15  After the Federal Court of
2
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Appeal declared zero-rating to have no statutory underpinning, the
Board can no longer take this system into account in setting the
levies.16  The only parties whose exemption from the levy can be
reflected in the rates set by the Board are those who have
perceptual disabilities.17  Other factors that the Board considers in
setting the levies include a given medium’s alternative uses.18
LEVIES AS COMPENSATION AND REGULATION: SIGNS OF WEAKNESS
<5> The weaknesses of the Act stem from the difficulty of
identifying proper media and devices on which to impose the
levy.19  The narrow application of the Act’s provisions reflects this
difficulty: While it isolates certain kinds of media as subject to the
levy, it does not authorize its imposition on other devices that
actually duplicate copyrighted material. The same case that
declared zero-rating unsupported by statutory law held that a
permanently embedded memory incorporated into a digital audio
recorder cannot be subject to the levy system.20  This exempts the
most ubiquitous of hard drive players used for music: the iPod and
similar mp3 players.
<6> Essentially, the Act mandates levies on audio recording media,
defined as "recording med[ia] regardless of material form, onto
which a sound recording may be reproduced and that is of a kind
ordinarily used by individual consumers for that purpose."21
Interpreting this extremely broad provision, the Board had reached
the conclusion that the levy was applicable in the case of digital
audio recorders.22  In so doing, it effectively took the position that
it could look through the device being sold (e.g., the mp3 player)
and reach the recording medium (i.e., the permanently embedded
memory) found in that device.
<7> The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed with the Board. The
court found, based on the Board's own reasoning and the private
copying tariff that the Board certified, that "it is the device that is
the defining element of the levy and not the memory incorporated
therein."23  The Court concluded that the Board could not "establish
a levy and determine the applicable rates by reference to the
device and yet assert that the levy is being applied on something
else."24  The ultimate subject matter of the levy was the device
(i.e., the digital audio recorder) rather than a medium (i.e.,
memory) as defined in the Act. 25  Accordingly, the levy did not
apply to digital audio recorders. 26  In so ruling, the Court
acknowledged that the source of this exclusion was Parliament’s
difficulty in predicting the exact evolution of technology.27
<8> Parliament’s understandable lack of foresight results in a
revenue base that does not reflect reality. Broadening this base to
3
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include a wider range of devices, however, creates other practical
problems. Devices that are capable of reproducing, distributing, and
retaining copyrighted material are so diverse in their functions and
capabilities that it is difficult to subject even some of the most
ubiquitous of them to levy systems without becoming overinclusive.
Thus, the Board has not imposed the levy on digital versatile disks
(“DVDs”), removable micro hard drives, and removable memory
cards despite the CPCC’s request that it do so. These devices may
be used for the purpose of copying music, but the Act exempts
them because that is not their ordinary use.28
<9> The current court battles surrounding some peer-to-peer file
sharing systems—Kazaa, for example—also indicate how murky
delineating such boundaries can be. While the issue in those cases
is not the possible imposition of a levy but rather the legality of
these systems, a similar issue is raised: whether the mere
establishment of the infrastructure that allows the possibility of
copying authorizes or encourages duplication of copyrighted
works.29  How to define the technology that is responsible for
private reproduction of copyrighted audio recordings is as of yet a
highly contentious issue.
<10> An analogous situation to the Canadian levy system is that of
the AHRA in the United States. This statute established a royalty
system on the sale of digital audio recording devices, such as
audiocassettes, whose revenues are allocated among music
rightsholders.30  However, as with the Canadian Act, computer hard
drives, video home recording devices, and mp3 players do not fall
under the scope of the AHRA and are not subject to the levy.31
Very little has changed since the AHRA was enacted in 1992, and
many scholars are of the opinion that it has been ineffective both
as a compensation mechanism and as a regulatory scheme for
audio copyright.32  At the very least, there is an undeniable tide of
litigation over the private reproduction of copyrighted audio
recordings despite the passage of the AHRA.33  Given the parallels
between the American and the Canadian levy systems, there is
reason to think that the fate of the Canadian Act’s levy could be
very similar to that of the AHRA: statutory obsolescence.34
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE CONUNDRUM OF NON-PHYSICAL
PROPERTY
<11> The problems with the levies notwithstanding, at the heart of
the Canadian system is a valiant attempt to address the problems
of the unique character of intellectual property in the context of
today’s modern technology: Because intellectual property lacks
physical form, the public often treats it as a public good. Like public
goods, enjoyment of recorded music by one person does not
preclude its enjoyment by others, i.e., it is nonrivalrous.35  Most 4
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significantly, modern technology recently has made recorded music
nonexcludable—once music is released, it is nearly impossible to
contain and regulate its dispersal to others.36  Physical property, on
the other hand, is both rivalrous and excludable; it is no pipe
dream to expect that those who purchase an item of physical
property (e.g., a rake) will not duplicate and distribute exact
replicas of this property.
<12> The ease of sharing copyrighted material, therefore, makes
laws that limit the distribution and use of such material particularly
difficult to enforce.37  The United States’ Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”)38  perfectly illustrates this difficulty. The
DMCA was enacted in 1998 to adapt copyright law to the digital
age by making it a crime to override technological barriers limiting
and controlling use of copyrighted material.39  Despite the fact that
the music lobby vigorously pursues these statutory rights in
court,40  18 million consumers copied CDs and 27 million
consumers made CDs from music files stored on their computers by
the end of 2004.41  The public often disregards—even if their
actions are not based on conscious ideology—the private property
rights of copyright owners because intellectual property currently
lacks the rivalrous and excludable qualities of private physical
property.
<13> Nevertheless, as is the case with public goods, it would be
hard to create incentives for individuals to provide recorded music if
none of the securities inherent in property rights were maintained.
By retaining interests that include the rights of exclusion and
remuneration for production, creators may theoretically recover the
cost of producing music along with enough profit to make it worth
their while to do so.42  Thus, there were strong public policy
reasons— “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” —
behind the creation of copyright laws that granted creators
exclusive rights to their works.43  The Canadian system recognizes
the dichotomy between the reality of a product’s existence in the
modern age and the need to create incentives for rightsholders to
create the product.44  The limitations of the Canadian levy system,
however, demonstrate the inherent difficulty in translating an
appreciation for the characteristics of intellectual property into a
practicable regulatory and compensatory system.
CONCLUSION
<14> Canadian copyright law represents a significant departure from
models that presume enforceable exclusivity in intellectual property.
It follows traditional models by guarding against unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of protected material. At the same
time, it recognizes the reality of a product—copyrighted sound
recordings—that has ceased to be excludable. To balance the reality 5
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of users who treat musical recordings as if they were a public good
against the need to compensate creators for their products, the Act
has imposed a levy on manufacture and importation of blank audio
recording media. However, the exponential progress and divergence
of technological systems pose serious questions about the practical
impact of such a system; much like the AHRA, it is possible that it
will prove unsuccessful in its current form as a compensatory and
regulatory system for copyright.
<15> Despite the Canadian system’s shortcomings, its theoretical
underpinnings could prove invaluable as a springboard for copyright
reform. At the end of the day, those involved with the music
industry need to examine the lessons of Canada’s levy system and
grapple with the competing interests of rightsholders and users
alike, whether through legal reform, technological innovation, or
modification of current market models. Barlow was premature in
declaring victory in his revolution against copyright as we know it;
as the Canadian system of alternative compensation indicates, we
are at a crossroads with regard to copyright law and our direction is
not yet clear.
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